Duke Law Journal
VOLUME

1987

SEPTEMBER

NUMBER

4

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE OF
FEDERALISM
MARTIN

H. REDISH*

AND SHANE V. NUGENT**

Through thepassage oftime, the dormant commerce clause doctrine has
acquired a patina of legitimacy; the doctrinefrequently is used by the
judiciary to overturn state regulation of commerce. Professor Martin
Redish and Shane Nugent argue that time alone cannot legitimize such
actions by the courts, and that the Constitutionprovides no textual basis
for the exercise of this authority. Moreover, they contend that the doctrine actually undermines the carefully structuredfederal balance embodied in the text They further argue that nontextual rationalesare
flawed, and thatjurisprudence based on the text of the Constitution can
deal adequately with discriminatory state legislation currently overturned by reference to a "dormant" commerce clause.

Since the early 1940s,' Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce 2 has grown through judicial interpretation to the point where today it is virtually unlimited in its reach. 3 But as is the case with all of
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D.
1970, Harvard University. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Ronald Allen, Robert
Bennett and Thomas Merrill for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. The article also benefited from a workshop given as part of the Law and Social Theory Program at the University of
Michigan School of Law.
** B.A. 1984, Knox College, J.D. 1987, Northwestern University.
1. See, eg., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
2. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. See, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (Commerce
clause extends federal minimum-wage regulation to state and local public entities.); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Regulation of local restaurants was within the scope of the commerce clause.). See generally 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4.1-.10 (1st ed. 1986).
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Congress's powers enumerated in article I of the Constitution, 4 the commerce power need not be exercised by Congress. Thus, despite the exten-

sion of the commerce power, Congress has left numerous areas free from
federal statutory regulation. Moreover, even when Congress has invoked
its authority, substantial room has been left for state regulation in certain
areas.5

In a number of instances, however, although Congress has failed to
enact legislation preempting state commerce regulation, the Supreme
Court nevertheless has invalidated a state regulation as a violation of the

commerce clause. 6 The Court has done so when it has found that such
regulation either discriminates against out-of-state interests or unduly
burdens the free flow of commerce among the states. 7 The commerce
clause in its "dormant" state8 is thought to invalidate such state regulation, although it is accepted that Congress may choose to overrule the

judicial invalidation of a particular state regulation by statutorily authorizing it.9

Traditionally, the dormant commerce clause was considered an arcane aspect of American constitutional law that fell far behind individual
liberties as a generator of academic or student interest. In recent years,

however, the dormant commerce clause has been the subject of a resurgence of both scholarly 0 and judicial'1 concern. Leading constitutional
4. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987) (regulation of
purchase of corporate securities); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (regulation of storage and disposal of nuclear reactor waste).
6. See, eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (State statute requiring prescribed
packaging for native fruit sold outside state unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (State statute rcquiring specified type of rear fender
mudguard for trucks unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.).
7. See generally I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, §§ 11.1-.10.
8. The label "dormant" has been criticized as misleading:
The term connotes something with the potential for action, yet currently in repose. It is
clear that what remains dormant is Congress, and not the commerce clause. The clause's
limitation on state regulation can certainly be termed implicit, silent, or negative, but dormancy does not accurately describe the situation.
Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LU. 425, 425 n.1 (1982).
9. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex reL Sullivan, Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the
Court, stated that Congress has "undoubted" power to "permit the states to regulate the commerce

in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible." 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See generally
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-40 (1946) (McCarran Act constitutionally validated state statute that discriminated between foreign and domestic insurance companies.).
10. See, eg., Eule, supra note 8; Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395 (1986); Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination
of Commerce ClauseJurisprudence,50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981); Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Maki:ig Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986); Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 409 (1979); Sed-

ler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis
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scholars have recalled that, like it or not, ours is a complex federal system, giving rise to numerous constitutional problems inherent in the division of authority between two levels of political sovereignty. The
dormant commerce clause, as an example of one such problem, is thus
seen as worthy of renewed study.
Much of the recent literature has focused largely on the substantive
standards to be employed in deciding whether state regnlation is permissible. To that end, these works have attempted primarily to determine
the proper purposes to be served by the clause and the specific content
that the doctrine should possess-often reaching conflicting conclusions
on these issues. 12 Such efforts, we believe, are reminiscent of an argument over the proper lapel widths to be placed on the emperor's new
clothes. With limited exceptions, the recent literature expends relatively
little effort attempting either to find the textual source or to prove the
legitimacy of the dormant commerce clause.1 3 Our position is that no
such legitimate constitutional source exists: the simple fact is that there
is no dormant commerce clause to be found within the text or textual
structure of the Constitution. 14
If we are correct in our assertion that the dormant commerce clause
finds no authorization in the constitutional text, then the Supreme Court
in Terms of ConstitutionalStructure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125.
11. In recent years, the Supreme Court's interest in the area appears to have increased dramatically. See, eg., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (State statute banuing importation of baitfish
upheld as serving legitimate local purpose of preventing parasitic infection of native fish.); BrownForman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (State statute limiting
in-state liquor pricing to outside-state wholesale price violated the commerce clause.); South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (State statute requiring timber from state lands
to be partially processed in-state unconstitutionally burdened commerce.); see also Farber, supra
note 10, at 400 (noting the Court's increasing willingness to strike down state statutes in commerce
clause cases).
12. Professors Eule and Tushnet, for example, emphasize "the process-oriented protection of
representational government" as the concept's ultimate rationale. Eule, supra note 8, at 443;
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 150. Professor Regan, on the other hand, has argued that in interpreting
the dormant commerce clause "the Court is concerned and should be concerned only with preventing purposeful [state] protectionism." Regan, supra note 10, at 1093.
13. Professor Regan has expended the greatest effort in this attempt. See infra notes 103-10
and accompanying text; see also Sedler, supra note 10, at 968-99.
14. After the initial draft of this article was completed, Justice Scalia filed a partial dissent in
which he anticipated some of our basic conclusions.
[Tihe language of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity. Nor can one
assume generally that Congress' Article I powers are exclusive; many of them plainly coexist with concurrent authority in the States. Furthermore, there is no correlative denial of
power over commerce to the States in Art. I, § 10, as there is, for example, with the power
to coin money or make treaties....
The least plausible theoretical justification of all is the idea that in enforcing the negative Commerce Clause the Court is not applying a constitutional command at all, but is
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has no power to use the clause to invalidate state commerce legislation.
Our federal constitutional democracy prohibits the unrepresentative federal judiciary from invalidating decisions of the state legislatures except
when authorized by some provision or combination of provisions of the
Constitution, or when clearly contrary to congressional action.15 Absent
textual foundation, the dormant clause cannot stand, regardless of
whatever valuable social, economic or political policies the concept
might be thought to foster.
It is true, of course, that on occasion scholars have argued that the
Court may "read into" the Constitution's broad precepts that lack a specific basis in text-what has been referred to as the "unwritten constitution." 16 Such a position has in fact been specifically urged as a
justification for the dormant commerce clause.17 Although the issue is
merely interpreting the will of Congress, whose silence in certain fields of interstate commerce (but not in others) is to be taken as a prohibition of regulation.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2810, 2827-28 (1987) (citations
omitted); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652-53 (1987) (Scalia,
J.,concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
While Justice Scalia's position is similar to ours in ultimate result, we believe that our textual,
historical, theoretical and policy analyses provide a firm and detailed theoretical grounding for Justice Scalia's conclusious.
15. See generally Redish & Drizin, ConstitutionalFederalismand JudicialReview: The Role of
TcxtualAnalysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1987). Thus, in an earlier article one of the authors stated:
[W]hile the Court may necessarily exercise considerable freedom in defining and applying
constitutional language, it does not follow that it can supplement the specific provisions of
the Constitution by writing new ones, rather than interpreting existing ones. For, if recognized, such a power knows no logical bounds: if the Court's constitutional pronouncements are not required to have at least an arguable basis in the document's language, the
Court's decisions inescapably become mere fiat, insulated from reasoned debate other than
in the purely legislative sense of debating the normative wisdom of whatever "constitutional" rule the Court is considering devising.
Redish, Due Process,Federalism,and PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1112, 1130 (1981). This restriction on the judiciary stands in contrast to the other branches:
Neither theoretically nor practically does the judiciary have a freedom to function
equivalent to that possessed by the execntive and legislative branches. While those
branches are authorized and able to act on an ad hoc basis and usually to decide solely on
the basis of their views of normative policy, the judiciary is confined institutionally by the
flow of past legal developments, by the concern about future applications of its decisions,
and by the constraints of the governing documents that it interprets.... The unrepresentative nature of the federal judiciary largely confines the legitimacy of the judiciary's operation. Once the judiciary departs from this practice and instead attempts to operate without
concern for any factor other than its own personal and isolated preferences, it has abandoned its role and therefore its legitimacy in a democratic system.
Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine
(Book Review), 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1400 (1985).
16. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 (1975)
(advocating judicial role beyond "pure interpretive" model); see also M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIcaHTs ix, 91-145 (1982) (supporting extraconstitutional policymaking by the judiciary in human rights context).
17. See Regan, supra note 10, at 1110-25; Sedler, supra note 10, at 977-82.
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largely beyond the scope of this article,1 8 we believe this approach lacks
any basis in constitutional democratic theory. 19 Even if we were to assume that a judicial supplement to the text may, under certain circumstances, be accepted, such a view could not justify recognition of the
dormant commerce clause. For we will demonstrate that not only is
there no textual basis to support recognition of such a concept, but also
that the dormant commerce clause actually contradicts, and therefore
directly undermines, the Constitution's carefully established textual
structure for allocating power between federal and state sovereigns. If
this is the case, then invocation of the dormant commerce clause would
constitute a considerably greater judicial usurpation of constitutional authority than would a mere judicial supplement to a text otherwise silent
on the matter.
Ultimately, we conclude that the dormant commerce clause is invalid because it reverses the political inertia established by the Constitution.
Under the dormant commerce clause, the federal judiciary-the organ of
the federal government most insulated from state influence and the organ
traditionally feared most by the states2 0-makes the initial legislative
judgment whether state regulation of interstate commerce is reasonable.
If the Court strikes down economic regulations, the states must somehow
force Congress to reverse the decision of the Court through legislationa process made difficult because of Congress's inherent political inertia.
Our historical and textual analyses lead us to conclude that this is clearly
not the plan of the Constitution. State power to regulate interstate commerce was desigued to be determined solely by the political judgment of
Congress, where the states retain enough political power to block congressional action, since Congress's inertia is not against them. 21 As such,
the constitutional balance favors the states since Congress must over22
come its own political inertia to reverse a state regulatory action.
Moreover, we will argue that the failure to adhere to this constitutional balance effectively undermines many of the basic advantages
thought to be derived from a federal system, not the least of which is the
18. The question is considered in greater detail in Redish & Drizin, supra note 15, at 17-23. It
is argued "that as a matter of neither constitutional nor democratic theory may the Supreme Court
adjudicate constitutional challenges without regard to constitutional text." Id. at 4. This article will
incorporate by reference the analysis of the role of textualism in constitutional democratic theory
contained in that earlier publication.
19. See infra notes 156-70 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
22. The analysis may well be different, however, if the ground for judicial invalidation is the
discriminatory effect of state regulation on out-of-state residents. Such a situation might well implicate the privileges and immunities clause. See infra notes 190-219 and accompanying text.
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desire to encourage individual state experimentation. 23 This benefit of

federalism should be sacrificed only when the negative impact on the nation's economy is so severe that preemptive congressional action can
overcome the hurdles of political inertia.24
This article proceeds in six parts. In the first section of the article,

we examine the origins and development of the dormant commerce
clause in Supreme Court decisions. 25 Next, we argue that the dormant
commerce clause has no basis in the Constitution, considering and rejecting the conceivable arguments that find a textual or quasi-textual authorization for the clause. 26 In the third section of the article, we
proceed to demonstrate the inconsistency of the clause with the Constitution's allocation of authority within the nation's federal structure. 27 We
then critique and reject the possible nontextual justifications for the dormant commerce clause.2 8 The fifth section proceeds to examine the
methods of federal and state regulation of interstate commerce that
would remain after the demise of the dormant commerce clause. 29 Fi-

nally, we discuss and reject the "democratic process" critique of the dormant commerce clause. 30
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DORMANTr COMMERCE CLAUSE

The Supreme Court has used the dormant commerce clause to invalidate a myriad of state regulations affecting interstate commerce. For
example, the Court, relying on the clause, has invalidated state licensing
23. See infra notes 119-55 and accompanying text.
24. Certain commentators, largely on grounds of political theory, have argued that the dormant
commerce clause can properly serve only one value, namely, the "democratic process" concern that
state legislation might disproportionately affect out-of-state residents, who were unrepresented in the
legislative process. See Eule, supra note 8, at 438-43; Tushnet, supra note 10, at 130-31. As so
revised, the clause would protect only against state legislation discriminating against out-of-state
residents. This has led one of these commentators to suggest that the dormant commerce clause, as
a separate concept, is no longer necessary, since the privileges and immunities clause may be construed to perform the same function. Eule, supra note 8, at 446-48. Purely in terms of result, this
conclusion is similar to our own. It is our position, however, that despite this coincidental similarity
in result the internal logic of this theoretical critique is fundamentally flawed in several respects, see
infra notes 234-40 and accompanying text, and in any event ultimately fails because of its lack of
grounding in constitutional text. See infra notes 246-48 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 31-78 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 79-118 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 119-55 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 190-226 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 227-48 and accompanying text.
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requirements, 3 1 train length restrictions, 32 mudguard requirements, 33
truck length prohibitions, 34 and various produce regulations.3 5 But upon
what constitutional or interpretive foundation does the dormant commerce clause rest? Because the Court has for many years simply assumed the dormant commerce clause's constitutional legitimacy, it is not
as easy as one might think to discover the original constitutional theory
behind the concept's creation.
A.

Chief Justice Marshall and the Dormant Commerce Clause.

The opinions of Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark cases of Gibbons v. Ogden 36 and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 37 provide a
starting point in the search for the origins of the dormant commerce
clause. In Gibbons, the New York legislature had granted a monopoly to
operate steamships between New Jersey and New York. Gibbons argued
that the monopoly was invalid under the commerce clause, as well as
under federal navigation legislation.3 8 The Court, however, dismissed
the question as to whether a state could, in accordance with the Constitution, regulate commerce among the several states. 39 Instead, Chief Justice Marshall maintained that the "sole question" before the Court was:
"can a State regulate commerce... among the States, while Congress is
regulating it?" 4 The Court answered this question in the negative, holding that Congress, pursuant to the commerce clause, had enacted a constitutionally valid law, regulating the same subject matter as the New
York act, and that therefore the federal act controlled under the
41
supremacy clause.
Before reaching the Court's actual decision, the Chief Justice flirted
with the concept that the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to
31. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (license requirement for vendors of steamship
tickets to or from foreign countries); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (license requirement
for common carriers using public highways).
32. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex reL Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
33. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
34. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
35. Huut v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (apple packaging requirement); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (milk pasteurization and
sale requirements); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (milk price regnlation).
36. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
37. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
38. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 186.
39. Id. at 199-200.
40. Id. at 200.
41. Id. at 200-22. Justice Johnson, concurring in the judgment, would have invalidated the
New York monopoly on the grounds that the constitutional grant of power to regulate commerce
among the states precluded a state from exercising a concurrent power to regulate such commerce.
Id. at 222-39.
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regulate commerce among the states necessarily precluded the states
from exercising a concurrent power over the same object. 42 Although
the Court purported to avoid deciding the question whether the states
could constitutionally regulate commerce in the absence of preemptive
federal legislation, the Chief Justice's opinion is famous for answering
this very question in dicta.
Marshall appears to have believed that the state and federal governments possessed very different powers over interstate commerce. In considering the argument that the state and federal governments had
concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce, just as the state and
federal governments had concurrent power to levy taxes,4 3 he raised a
possible distinction between the exercise of the two powers:
In imposing taxes for State purposes, [the States] are not doing what
Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States.
When, then, each government exercises the power of taxation, neither
is exercising the power of the other. But, when a State proceeds to
regulate commerce... among the several States, it is exercising the
very power that is granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing
which Congress is authorized to do.44
Marshall found "great force in this argument," and noted that "the
45
Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted."
Marshall did not establish the dormant commerce clause in Gibbons,46 although according to Justice Frankfurter, he could have garnered the votes to do so. 47 Still, the opinion contributed to the concept's
development. It is, however, the Chief Justice's opinion in Willson v.

Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,48 which most directly demonstrates that
Marshall recognized a negative aspect to the commerce power. In this
42. Id. at 197-210.

43. Id. at 198-200.
44. Id. at 199-200.
45. Id. at 209. This argument has given rise to the view that Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce is exclusive. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 17 (1937 & photo. reprint 1964).
46. See I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, § 11.2.
47. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 45, at 16.
48. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). The Marshall Court had one other opportunity to consider the
commerce power before deciding Willson. But in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
(1827), Marshall maintained that the sole question before the Court was whether a state could constitutionally require an importer to take out a license before selling imported goods in that state. Id.
at 436. The Court held that a Maryland license fee for the sale of imports was a tax on imports
which violated the Constitution's article 1, section 10, clause 2 limitation on the states, which proscribed the states from levying imposts or duties on imports without the consent of Congress. Id at
445. The Court also held that the license fee was invalid because it "must be in opposition to the act
of Congress which authorizes importation" passed pursuant to Congress's article I, section 8, clause
3 power to regulate commerce. Id. at ,48.
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decision the Chief Justice first used the term "dormant" in connection
with the commerce clause.
In Willson, Delaware had authorized the building of a dam across a

navigable creek. 49 The plaintiffs contended that the authorizing act was
in conflict with the federal government's power to regulate interstate
commerce. 5 0 The Court rejected the challenge to the statute and summa-

rily declared:
We do not think that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek
Marsh Company to place a dam across the creek, can, under all the
circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the [federal]
state, or as being in conflict
power to regulate commerce in its dormant
51
with any law passed on the subject.
Thus, the concept of a dormant commerce clause can be traced back to
Marshall's opinions in Gibbons and Willson. Neither of these cases, however, provided guidance as to the nature of the "dormant state" present
52
within the commerce clause.

B. Cooley and the Selective Dormant Commerce Clause.
In the years after Gibbons and Willson, the Court on occasion expressed reluctance to invoke a dormant commerce clause,5 3 and it was

not until Cooley v. Board of Wardens54 that the doctrine became firmly
established in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Cooley, the controversy
centered upon a Pennsylvania statute requiring ships to engage a local
pilot when entering or departing the port of Philadelphia. Failure to do

so resulted in a sixty dollar penalty.55 Justice Curtis, writing for the majority, rejected several attacks upon the statute,5 6 ultimately upholding it
49. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 250-51.
50. Id. at 251-52. Noting that Congress had not passed any act that would preempt the Delaware statute, the Court maintained that "[t]he repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the constitution
is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states; a power which has not been so exercised as to affect the question." Id. at
252.
51. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
52. See id.; Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189. After Wilson, Marshall was unable to pass on
any other questions regarding the commerce clause. Marshall did hear the first oral argument in
Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), but died before a decision had becn
reached. See I R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, § 11.3.
53. See, e.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578-79 (1847) (opinion of Taney, C.J.).
54. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
55. See id. at 311-12.
56. Id. at 312-15. First, the statute was attacked as an impermissible impost or duty on imports, exports or tonnage under article I, section 10, clauses 2 and 3. Id. at 312-14. Second, Cooley
argued that Pennsylvania was imposing an unconstitutional duty, rather than regulating pilotage.
Id. at 314. Finally, the statute was assailed because it allegedly gave a preference to the port of
Philadelphia and required a vessel from another state to pay a duty in violation of the prohibition of
such practices contained in article I, section 9, clause 5. Id at 314-15.
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as a constitutional regulation of commerce. 57
Justice Curtis, in his analysis, rejected the argument that Congress
had been granted exclusive power to regulate commerce by referring to a
federal statute enacted in 1789;5 8 this statute permitted state regulation
of pilotage by then-existing or thereafter-enacted state statutes. 59 He
maintained that if the Constitution stripped the states of all power to
regulate commerce, then Congress could not delegate such a power to
the states. Because the 1789 act sanctioned such state statutes, there was
"necessarily implie[d] a constitutional power [on the part of the state] to
60
legislate."
Justice Curtis then argued that:
[I]t would be in conformity with the contemporary exposition of the
Constitution [when it was ratified] ... to hold that the mere grant of
such a power to Congress, did not imply a prohibition on the States to
exercise the same power; that it is not the mere existence of such a
power, but its exercise [of*the same power] by Congress, which may be
incompatible with the exercise of the same power by the States, and
that the States
may legislate in the absence of congressional
61
regulations.
Curtis reasoned that the power to regulate commerce must be viewed in
terms of the subject being regulated. While some subjects required a uniform federal rule, others required diverse regulations that only the states
could provide.62 From this Curtis concluded that:
Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of [the commerce] power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight
of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all
of them, what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of
this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
57. Id. at 321.
58. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, § 4, 1 Stat. 53, 54.
59. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 317-18.

60. Id. at 318.
61. Id. at 318-19 (citing Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251
(1829); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819); THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton)). Curtis noted that a state power
to regulate the District of Columbia, for example, would be incompatible with the grant of such a
power to Congress. Id. at 318.
62. Justice Curtis reasoned that:
[W]hen the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the nature of the
power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to
refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress. Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast

field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subjeet now in question, as
imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.

Id. at 319.
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system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature
as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot63 be
affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain.
Thus, by focusing on the objects of commerce rather than the power
itself, Curtis ultimately avoided answering the difficult question of
whether Congress's power to regulate commerce was exclusive. Instead,
he struck a pre-Civil War judicial compromise. His approach simultaneously avoided confrontation with states' rights advocates, yet reserved
for the Court the ability to invalidate objectionable state legislation under
a theory of partial exclusivity. Moreover, the case before the Court provided the perfect vehicle for the articulation of the selective doctrine with
little contemporary objection, since the Court found that Congress had
permitted the states to regulate the commerce in question.
At the close of his opinion, Curtis reemphasized the Court's adoption of a narrow, "selective" approach to questions concerning the regulation of interstate commerce. He rationalized that the Court's opinion
64
and did not "extend to the
was confined to the precise question before it
question what other subjects, under the commercial power, are within
the exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated by the States in
the absence of all congressional legislation."' 65 Thus was born the "Cooley Rnle of Selective Exclusiveness."' 66 Under the Cooley rule, only those
state regulations affecting a specific category of interstate commercethat which by its very nature requires exclusive federal regulation-are
invalid by direct application of the commerce clause.
C.

Welton and the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Nearly twenty-five years after the Cooley decision, the Court attempted to supplement the justification for the dormant commerce
clause. Welton v. Missouri67 involved a Missouri protectionist statute,
requiring a "peddler's" license for merchants selling goods that came
63. Id. Curtis maintained that the Pennsylvania statute did not regulate the type of commerce
falling into the "exclusive" category. Id. at 319-20. He further noted that the federal act of 1789
"manifest[ed] the understanding of Congress, at the outset of the government, that the nature of
th[e] subject [before the Court] is not such as to require its exclusive legislation." Id. at 320.
64. Id. Justice Curtis failed to consider Chief Justice Marshall's view of the commerce clause,
which permitted states to enact legislation pursuant to their "police power" that could have a substantial effect on commerce. See id. at 311-21.
65. Id. at 320.
66. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, § 11.4. The Court in Cooley
noted that the state statute had a nondiscriminatory effect since the statute applied to residents and
nonresidents alike, despite an exemption for any vessels engaged in the Pennsylvania coal trade. 53
U.S. (12 How.) at 311, 313. The "nondiscriminatory" effect of the Pennsylvania statute has been
considered an important element in the Cooley decision. See 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, supra note 3, § 11.4.
67. 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
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from other states. If, however, the goods were produced within Missouri, no license was required. 68 The Court invalidated the statute pursuant to the dormant commerce clause doctrine announced in Cooley,
stating that:
[I]t has been held that the States may provide regulations until Congress acts with reference to them; but where the subject to which the
power applies is national in its character, or of such a nature as to
admit of uniformity
of regulation, the power is exclusive of all State
69
authority.
The Welton Court argued that uniformity of commercial regulation is
necessary to protect articles of commerce from hostile legislation. 70
Thus, Justice Field declared that "[t]he fact that Congress has not seen fit
to prescribe any specific rules to govern inter-State commerce does not
affect the question. Its inaction on this subject... is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and untrammelled. ,
Possibly recognizing the dormant commerce clause's tenuous textual basis, Field attempted to characterize the concept as an inference of
congressional intent from Congress's failure to enact its own regulatory
legislation. 72 The Court, however, never fully explicated this supplemental justification for the dormant commerce clause. Nonetheless, it has
become a firm part of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.
D. The View of the Modern Court.
The modern Court appears untroubled by the lack of any textual
justification for the dormant commerce clause. In Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,73 the Court noted that the states could neither
impede the "free flow" of commerce nor regulate elements of interstate
commerce requiring national uniformity. 74 The Court refused to choose
between its previously articulated justifications for the dormant commerce clause, because "[w]hether... this long-recognized distribution of
power between the national and the state governments is predicated upon
the implications of the commerce clause itself, or upon the presumed
intention of Congress, where Congress has not spoken, the result is the
68. Id. at 275.

69. Id. at 280.
70. Id. at 281.
71. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
72. Id. Justice Field cited three cases in support of the "views here expressed": The State
Freight Tax Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). Not one of the cases which Field cited, however, alluded to the idea of inferring congressional intent from congressional silence.
73. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

74. Id. at 770.
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same."' 75 Instead, the Court continues to employ the dormant commerce
clause, regardless of its constitutional justification, by summarily adhering to precedent:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that
the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus
affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the nation-a
commerce, and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, this
Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the
76
final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.
Since Southern Pacific, the Court has not reconsidered the constitutional basis of the dormant commerce clause. Rather, in unquestioning
reliance on the clause, the Court has continued to invalidate certain state
77
regulations affecting interstate commerce.
In some respects, there seems to be little remarkable about the interpretation of the commerce clause originally established in Cooley. When
Congress expressly determines, as it did in Cooley, that the nature of the
commerce in question does not require exclusive regulation, the states
may exercise power over that commerce. Alternatively, when Congress
determines, by the enactment of federal legislation, that certain objects of
commerce require exclusive federal regulation, the conflicting state regulations are clearly invalid under the supremacy clause. 78 It is, however,
under a third scenario that the troubling effect of the Cooley doctrine is
revealed. Under Cooley, when Congress has not regulated the objects of
commerce in question, the Court itself determines whether the nature of
the commerce requires exclusive federal regulation. Thus, the Court, in
testing state legislation, essentially makes what amounts to an intrinsically legislative determination as to whether a particular type of commerce requires exclusive federal regulation.
II.

THE ASSERTED CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES FOR THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE

Together, the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars have advanced three theories to reconcile the dormant commerce clause with the
75. Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
76. Id at 769. "[I]n general Congress has left it to the courts to formulate the rules thus
interpreting the commerce clause in its application, doubtless because it has appreciated the destructive consequences to the commerce of the nation if their protection were withdrawn .... Id. at 770
(citing Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441 (1939)).
77. See, eg., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981) (truck
length limitations); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (waste importation
prohibition); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (cantelope packing requirements);
Bibb .v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959) (truck mudguard requirements).
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2; see, eg., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (striking part of
a state motor vehicle law inconsistent with federal Bankruptcy Act under the supremacy clause).
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constitutional text. The first of these argues that the textual grant of the

commerce power to Congress automatically provides an implicit constitutional negation of concurrent state power. 79 The second theory finds

support for the dormant commerce clause in the historical evidence surrounding the decision of the framers to give the commerce power to the
national government.80 The third theory argues that Congress's failure
to regulate a particular aspect of interstate commerce necessarily implies
a congressional decision to leave the subject unregulated; thus, any state

regulation of commerce is inherently inconsistent with congressional intent and therefore invalid under the supremacy clause.81 In this section,
we critically examine-and reject-these three conceivable methods for
rationalizing the dormant commerce clause with the Constitution's text.

A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Text
of the Commerce Power.

Both article I, section 1082 and the privileges and immunities clause
of article IV8 3 impose certain limits on state behavior.84 None of these
prohibitions, however, can be (or has been) relied upon as a basis for

recognition of the dormant commerce clause.8 5 Thus, no constitutional
provision supports the holding in Cooley that the states may not regulate
certain objects of commerce if the Court determines that these objects of
79. See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
82. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall
be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
83. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
84. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-34 (1978); see also infra notes 119-22 and
accompanying text.
85. Interestingly, the dormant commerce clause operates in much the same manner as the conditional prohibitions in article I, section 10, clauses 2-3. In those situations, states are prohibited
from taking certain actions, unless Congress affirmatively authorizes such behavior. Neither ofthese
clauses, however, concerns the general power to regulate interstate commerce.
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commerce require exclusive federal regulation. 86
A second facet of dormant commerce clause theory is that Congress
may authorize state economic regulation that has been invalidated under
the dormant commerce clause. 87 Clearly, the aforementioned prohibitions do not provide a textual basis for this element of the doctrine,
either. Rather, the Court generally has maintained that the dormant
commerce clause derives directly from the article I, section 8 grant to
Congress of a power to regulate interstate commerce. 88 That provision
states that Congress shall have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 89 The commerce clause is not a self-executing power; rather, it
is a power that is given to Congress, to use or not, as it deems necessary.
Nowhere does the text of the Constitution or its amendments deny the
exercise of this same power to the states. 90
On the basis of the constitutional text, then, one of two conclusions
may be reached. One possibility is that the very existence of this constitutional grant of power to the federal government necessarily proscribes
the states from exercising any power over interstate commerce. This
view amounts to adoption of what is generally referred to as the "dual
federalism" model of the constitutional allocation of power between the
state and national governments: "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally
limiting fields of power-that of the national government and of the
States." 9 1 Alternatively, the clause may be taken to mean that the grant
of power to Congress enables Congress to override state regulation of
interstate commerce and, if necessary, to preempt state regulation of
commerce under the supremacy clause. Absent such affirmative congressional action, the states are free to regulate interstate commerce (subject,
of course, to traditional limitations on states' exercise of legislative jurisdiction). 92 This second theory constitutes an application of the "cooper86. See supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text. The Court's subsequent supposition that
congressional silence manifests Congress's intention that these objects of commerce remain unregulated does not rise to the level of constitutional interpretation. We address that issue separately. See
infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
87. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562-65 (1891); see also supra note 9.
88. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-21 (1851).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
90. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
91. Mason, Federalism: The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINrrE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (V. Earle ed. 1968).
92. It should be noted that the absence of a direct constitutional prohibition on state power
does not automatically vest a state with power it never possessed prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Illinois, for example, could not purport to regulate commerce between Maryland and Virginia, having no impact on Illinois, simply because the Constitution does not expressly deny such
power. Illinois never had this power in the first place.
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ative" model of federalism. 93 Our conclusion is that the dormant
commerce clause is not consistent with either theory.
1. The Dual FederalismModeL In the "dual federalism" model
of American constitutional government, the state and federal governments each exercise their own exclusive area ofjurisdiction. 94 According
to Professor Edward Corwin, the dual federalism model is composed of
four principles:
1. The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2.
Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3.
Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are
"sovereign" and hence "equal"; 4. The relation of the two centers with
each other is one of tension rather than collaboration. 95
Put another way, the dual federalism model encompasses "two mutually
exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power-that of the national government and of the States. The two authorities confront each other as
equals across a precise constitutional line, defining their respective jurisdictions."'96 For our purposes, the important component of the dual federalism model is the assumption that if a power is committed to one
sovereign, it cannot be exercised by the other sovereign. Thus, granting a
power to the federal government automatically denies that power to the
97
state governments.
Even if one were to accept the dual federalism model as the controlling theory of American federalism, the dormant commerce clause still
cannot survive. Under this model, the Constitution's textual grant of
power to Congress would simultaneously deprive the states of any power
to regnlate interstate commerce-a result substantially different from established dormant commerce clause doctrine. 9 Moreover, Congress
could not constitutionally authorize the states to enact legislation affecting commerce if the constitutional grant of power to regulate commerce
deprived the states of all power to enact any legislation affecting interstate commerce, for Congress presumably cannot cure such a lack of constitutional power.
In any event, the dual federalism model of American constitutional
government is not the accepted theory of American federalism. 99 In93. See generally D. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP (1962).

94. Id. at 22.
95. Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).
96. Mason, supra note 91, at 24-25.
97. Of course, the reverse is true as well.
98. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
99. See Redish, Supreme CourtReview of State Court "Federal"Decisions A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 382-88 (1985) (tracing historical development of dual federal-

ism and its import).
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deed, it is questionable whether it ever represented the controlling model
of constitutional government.I°° That the Constitution itself did not contemplate so rigid a division of sovereign power is, ironically, established
by the very existence of the direct constitutional prohibitions on state
power contained in article I, section 10.101 If the Constitution's drafters
had contemplated a dual federalism model, the prohibitions contained in
article I, section 10 would have been superfluous-the very grant of those
powers to Congress in article I, section 8 would have automatically precluded the concurrent exercise of state power in any of these areas. Two
facts make it clear that the Constitution contemplates at least a certain
potential overlap of state and federal legislative power. First, despite the
express grant of congressional power in article I, section 8 over many of
the same subjects, the framers deemed it necessary to include the express
prohibitions of article I, section 10. Second, in a number of instances,
including, in particular, the commerce power, the grant of a power to
Congress in section 8 is not matched by a corresponding prohibition of
state power in section 10.
2. The Cooperative FederalismModel. If one were to reject the
dual federalism model and instead adopt the alternative view that the
states can exercise a "concurrent power" over commerce, the constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce again breaks
down as textual support for the dormant commerce clause. Assuming
that the states and the federal government both retain power over interstate commerce, there exists no principled basis for the Court ever to
invalidate state regulation, at least in the absence of congressional pre10 2
emption, on the basis of the text of the commerce clause.
B.

HistoricalSupport for the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Since it is impossible to construe the text of the commerce clause to
justify the dormant commerce clause concept, the clause's advocates
have instead attempted to find support in various contemporaneous statements of the framers. Of course as an initial objection, we seriously question the relevance of any framers' understandings not manifested in the
text of the Constitution; for it was the text, not some unstated understanding, that was ratified into law. In any event, we believe that the
100. See D. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATEs 3-9 (3d ed. 1984)
(examining historical data relevant to debate between "dualists" and "cooperatives"); D. ELAZAR,
supra note 93, at 304-05 ("Co-operative" federalism explains the nature of the American federal
system.).
101. See supra note 82.
102. It should once again be emphasized that state regulation of interstate commerce conceivably could come into conflict with a specific constitutional prohibition and therefore be void.
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historical evidence provides no firm support for the dormant commerce
clause's existence. The historical arguments generally center on two
ideas: first, the framers' intent in creating the commerce power, and second, the restrictive meaning of "commerce" at the time of the Constitutional Convention.
1. The Intent of the Framers. That the framers did assume the
existence of the dormant commerce clause is the position of Professor
Donald Regan. He remarks that "[t]here is much evidence that the main
point of [the] grant [of power over interstate commerce] ... was not to
empower Congress, but rather to disable the states from regulating commerce among themselves."' 10 3 He further notes that "[t]he framers
wanted commerce among the states to be free of state-originated mercantilist impositions. Giving Congress the power to regulate internal commerce was one way of denying [the] states that power, under the view...
1
that [the] granted regulatory powers were exclusive." 04
If, however, the framers intended such a result, why did they fail to
incorporate this principle into the text? Why, instead of convolutedly
phrasing their intended prohibition on state power in terms of an express
grant offederal power, did the framers not simply include a direct prohibition on the exercise of state power? After all, in both articles 1105 and
IV 10 6 the framers expressly imposed numerous direct prohibitions on
state power. Their failure to do the same for the general power to regulate interstate commerce, then, strongly rebuts Professor Regan's assertion concerning their intent.
Professor Regan further notes that there is evidence suggesting that
Congress was given the commerce power in order to prevent state economic protectionism. But this is exactly the point--Congress was given
the power. That Congress was constitutionally vested with the legislative
power to disable the states from regulating interstate commerce in no
way implies that the Constitution itself automatically denies the states
such power. In this context, it is important to note that the historical
references generally cited in support of the dormant commerce clause
speak only of the potential dangers to national unity caused by interstate
economic friction. They do not specifically refer to the need forjudicial
oversight to prevent this problem in the absence of congressional action. 107 Thus, the framers were clearly aware of the dangers of interstate
103. Regan, supra note 10, at 1125.
104. Id.
105, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10. See supra note 82; infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. See supra note 83; infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
107. Forty years after the ratification of the Constitution, Madison stated that the commerce
power "was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States them-
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economic friction, and chose to deal with the problem solely by the vesting of a power in Congress, rather than by imposition of a direct constitutional prohibition (other than the privileges and immunities clause).
2. The Restrictive Meaning of "Commerce." Professor Regan
also maintains that the framers had a much narrower understanding of
the term "commerce" than is the case today. Thus, "as Congress' power
over interstate commerce is now understood, we cannot treat that power
as exclusive. But that does not mean the framers could not have re'08
garded as exclusive the much narrower power they were thinking of.'

It is certainly true that the modem expansive interpretation of both the
terms "commerce" and "among the several States" in the commerce
clause is considerably broader than those terms were understood in the
selves." Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprintedin 4 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 15 (1884). This statement has been cited as historical support for the dormant commerce clause. See, eg., Eule, supra note 8, at 431 (Commerce power is a
negative on the states rather than a positive federal power.). While a fair reading of Madison's letter
might be thought to indicate that the commerce clause was intended to be a negative on the states,
such an interpretation goes too far. On its face, Madison's language ean be construed to mean that
Congress alone was given the power to negate state regulations of commerce. Madison's letter must
be considered in its entirety and in the context in which it was written in order to understand the
type of negative on the states imposed by the commerce clause.
In his letters to Joseph Cabell, Madison discussed Congress's power to regulate commerce. In
his first letter, Madison attempted to explain the constitutionality of "the power in Congress to
impose a tariff for the encouragement of Manufactures." Letter of James Madison to Joseph Cabell
(Sept. 18, 1828), reprintedin 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 316 (1910). Madison noted that
"[t]he Constitution vests in Congress expressly 'the power to lay & collect taxes duties imposts &
excises;' and 'the power to regulate trade.'" Id. at 317 (emphasis added). The important point is
that Madison referred to the granting to Congress of power over commerce as a power that Congress
would "exercise" and "use." Id. He declined to comment on the wisdom of the tariff and closed:
"In the exercise of the [commerce] power, [the members of Congress] are responsible to their Constituents, whose right & duty it is, in that as in all other cases, to bring their measures to the test of
justice & of the general good." Id. at 340. Conspicuously absent was any discussion of the clause
itself as a limit on the states. Nor was the clause discussed in terms that would indicate that it was a
self-executing provision.
In another letter, Madison addressed Congress's power over interstate commerce. He wrote:
Being in the same terms with the power over foreign commerce, the same extent, if taken
literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it grew out of the abuse of the power
by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and
preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power
to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government, in which alone, however,
the remedial power could be lodged.
Letter of James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A, Ch. CCCLXVI at 478 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) (emphasis added) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
Taken together, Madison's letters reveal an understanding of the commerce clause providing
little support to the dormant commerce clause's proponents. While the power over interstate commerce may have been intended to have been a negative on state legislation, Madison apparently
believed-as the text itself indicates-that the power was to be exercised by Congress, not the Court.
108. Regan, supra note 10, at 1125.
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late eighteenth century; nevertheless, one might argue that the framers
themselves may well have contemplated the possibility of changes in interpretation over time. 10 9 Moreover, Professor Regan's suggestion also
must be rejected because of its fatal internal inconsistency in the choice
of governing interpretative theory: either we adopt an "originalist"
model of constitutional interpretation, in which event all of Congress's
exercises of that power beyond the original understanding are invalid; or
we do not, in which event all of Congress's exercises of the power are
equally valid, and no distinction at all would be drawn on this basis.
Such an attempt to employ two totally different-and mutually inconsistent-modes of constitutional interpretation for the very same clause
must be rejected as unprincipled in this context. In any event, it is difficult to understand why any constitutional consequences should flow
from such a distinction since the Court has never drawn such an originalist/nonoriginalist dichotomy in applying the dormant commerce clause.
Thus, even if accepted, Professor Regan's argument could not be employed to justify the modern doctrine.
Most importantly, Professor Regan's analysis iguores two important
facts. First, as we have already argued, the view that the framers assumed the commerce power to be exclusive is undermined by the explicit
prohibitions of article I, section 10. Thus, the text itself rebuts the inferences which Professor Regan draws from the framers' understanding of
the term "commerce." Second, as we shall demonstrate below, 110 the
dormant commerce clause actually contradicts and undermines the textual structure of federalism. In terms of the Constitution's plan, there is
all the difference in the world between a direct prohibition on state power
on the one hand, and the vesting in Congress of an option to invalidate
state action on the other.
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause as an Inference
of CongressionalIntent.
In Welton v. Missouri,1 the Court attempted to supplement the
Cooley justification for the dormant commerce clause. The theory advanced was that Congress's failure to regulate a particular type of interstate commerce implicitly manifests an intention to leave that particular
type of commerce unregulated. By using such an analysis, the Court
avoids interpreting the text of the commerce clause, because Congress
has somehow "acted" pursuant to its commerce power and thus has
109. See generally Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REv.
885 (1985) (hermeneutical investigation into meaning of "original intent" for Founding Fathers).
110. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
111. 91 U.S. 275 (1875); see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
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manifested its "intent." State legislation, then, is invalidated pursuant to
the supremacy clause, rather than pursuant to the commerce power-it
is a simple matter of federal preemption. Alternatively, Congress's failure to overrule the Court's dormant commerce clause decisions can be
viewed as manifesting Congress's intention to condone both the judicial
exercise of the power and the propriety of the result. Nevertheless, under
either scenario, congressional failure to legislate cannot legitimately be
transformed into legislation, for both theoretical and practical reasons.
When the Supreme Court invalidates state regulation of commerce
under the dormant commerce clause by relying on a congressional failure
to regulate a particular type of commerce, the Court relies on what can
only be the most abstract of legislative intentions. The Court apparently
need not point to a specific congressional refusal to regulate the particular type of commerce: that is, a failure to pass a specific piece of legislation.1 12 Instead, the Court can rely on the fact that this type of
commerce has not yet been regulated by Congress. Based on this fact
alone, the Court assumes that Congress was aware of possible problems
arising in this area of commerce, but nevertheless intended that it remain
unregulated. No theoretical canon of legislative construction and no
practical reality of the legislative process can justify so sweeping an assumption about congressional intent.
The Court's interpretation of Congress's intention ignores at least
two plausible explanations for the congressional failure to legislate. Initially, Congress may not even be aware that a particular type of commerce is being regulated by the states, much less that uniform national
regulation (or the lack thereof) is required. Further, in light of the complete absence of a record or text upon which to derive Congress's intent,
it is at least equally probable that Congress intended that the regulation
of the particular type of commerce be left to the individual states to regulate as they see fit, rather than that it be left completely unregulated.
Regardless of the Court's interpretation of Congress's intent, it is
"improper to transform a congressional failure to legislate into the
equivalent of legislation."" 3 Under the terms of the Constitution, only
the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
112. This fact distinguishes the dormant commerce clause cases from the analysis employed by
the Court in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972). In Flood, the Court refused to overturn its
earlier decisions finding that baseball was not a business for purposes of the antitrust laws, in light of
numerous unsuccessful attempts by Congress to overrule those decisions. In any event, with the
exception of this one difference, Flood is itself subject to much of the same criticisms we level at the
dormant commerce clause as an inference of congressional intent.
113. Redish, Abstention, Separation ofPowers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE
LJ. 71, 82 (1984).
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made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' "14
Before Congress enacts a law, the proposed legislation must undergo
thorough examination, debate and, ultimately, enactment in both chambers of Congress. Congressional failures to legislate are not, by definition, subject to this process.
No more persuasive is the argument that congressional failure to
overrule a judicial invalidation of state legislation amounts to congressional acceptance of the Court's action. "[R]eliance on a congressional
failure to overrule a limiting judge-made doctrine ... effectively condones through legislative inertia what was initially an improper and unauthorized judicial usurpation of legislative authority." ' 1 5 The Court is
merely attempting to transform a usurpation of congressional power into
the status of constitutionally enacted legislation-without the constitutional passage of the legislation. 116 As Professor Thomas Merrill aptly
notes:
The argument based on the possibility of congressional override ignores the institutional reality that, given its crowded agenda, Congress
is far more likely not to act than to act with respect to any particular
issue presented for its attention. The theoretical possibility of congressional override cannot disguise the fact that lawmaking by federal
courts would in most cases give the last word to the federal courts
rather than to Congress. In practice, therefore, institutionalization of
lawmaking by federal courts would represent a major shift in policymaking power away from Congress and 117
toward the federal judiciary,
in violation of the constitutional scheme.
Congress simply does not have available to it the time and resources to
police adequately the Court's jurisprudence and at the same time con8
sider the vast amount of legislation that is introduced each session."
Thus, the dormant commerce clause is not supported by the constitutional text, by the contemporaneous statements of the framers, or by any
inferences from congressional failure to legislate.

114, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
115. Redish, supra note 113, at 82.
116. Id.
117, Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1985)
(footnotes omitted).
118. For example, during the 98th Congress, 11,156 measures were introduced into both Houses
of Congress. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1987, at 235, table 404 (1987). Of the 11,156 measures introduced, only 677
measures were enacted-roughly 6%.
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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTION'S
STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM

The Constitution's Three-Level Structure
for Controlling State Power.

The Constitution's text establishes an intricate, three-level structure
for the allocation of power between the state and federal governments.
In one category of situations the states are expressly and absolutely prohibited from enacting certain types of legislation. In the second category,
the states must overcome Congress's institutional inertia in order to obtain congressional authorization for the state legislation. In the third category, the states are free to enact legislation; Congress, however, has
authority to preempt or overrule such state action by legislation enacted
pursuant to one of its enumerated powers.
First, the Constitution expressly precludes certain types of state legislation. The states, for example, may not "coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; [or] pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."1 1 9
Additionally, a state cannot discriminate against citizens of other
states.120 These provisions place absolute constitutional prohibitions on
state power to enact these measures. Consequently, absent constitutional
amendment, the states are permanently enjoined from enacting such
measures, and Congress, by itself, lacks authority to authorize such state
action.
Second, the Constitution places several prohibitions on the exercise
of state power that are not absolute, but rather conditional. Article I,
section 10 provides that:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall
be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage ....121

The states, therefore, cannot act in these areas absent affirmative authorization by Congress, unless the state enactment falls under one of the enumerated exceptions. In this context, the political inertia falls against the
exercise of state power, because of the inherent difficulty in obtaining
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2-3.
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affirmative congressional action. 122
Finally, Congress's enumerated powers in article I, section 8, when
read in conjunction with the terms of the supremacy clause, 123 make
clear that those powers neither expressly nor conditionally denied to the
states may be exercised by them, subject to reversal or preemption by
legislation enacted pursuant to one of Congress's enumerated powers.
These constitutional provisions, when taken together, make up the Constitution's infrastructure for allocating governmental power between the
state and federal systems.
The dormant commerce clause substantially undermines this constitutional balance of federalism, by imposing a judge-made barrier to state
regulation of interstate commerce that can be overcome only by means of
affirmative congressional action. There are two basic reasons why the
reversal of political inertia brought about by the dormant commerce
clause so fundamentally conflicts with the workings of this three-level
constitutional structure. It is to an examination of these reasons that we
now turn.
B.

The Benefit of PoliticalInertia: Barriersto the Legislative Process.

Absent the dormant commerce clause, the states would be able to
enact economic legislation unless it ran afoul of the Constitution's direct
textual prohibitions on state economic legislation or has been preempted
by an act of Congress. Under these circumstances, the Constitution establishes the inertia in favor of the exercise of state power, because the
states do not need to overcome any federal barrier before they enact their
economic legislation; affirmative congressional action (either before or after enactment of the state law) is required to invalidate the legislation.
When the Court invokes the dormant commerce clause, however, the
inertia is reversed, turning the constitutional balance of federalism
against the states.
Any attempt to obtain a specific piece of legislation from Congress
presents a nearly insurmountable task for the state, given the realities of
the federal legislative process. During each Congress, thousands of
measures are introduced into each house.124 Of the thousands of measures introduced, only a small percentage are enacted into law.125 The
congressional legislative process is an arduous one that may entail a series of compromises from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally
122.
123.
124.
125.

See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See supra note 118.
Id.
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voted upon by the members of each house.' 2 6 Further, the process is
lengthy, time-consuming, and replete with opportunities for delaying or

killing a bill.' 27 The process, moreover, contains a time constraint. Each
bill introduced must be passed by both houses before the expiration of
that Congress's two-year term. 28 If the bill is not passed within the two-

in the followyear period, it automatically dies and must be reintroduced
29

ing Congress, and the process begins once again.'
These difficulties can only be aggravated by the Court's initial determination that the state enactment places an undue burden on commerce,
regardless of whether the Court has made the correct decision. As a
general matter, "Congress is far more likely not to act than to act with
respect to any particular issue presented for its attention."' 30 When the
Supreme Court has already spoken on the matter, it is even less likely
that Congress will take issue with the Court's determination that the invalidated state statute placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.

Thus, the most obvious reason that states would prefer congressional to judicial oversight of their regulation of interstate commerce is
the considerably greater likelihood of congressional inaction than of congressional action. While the judiciary cannot itself initiate a review proceeding, once a legal challenge is privately instituted (a very likely event,
126. See generally R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 263-85 (2d ed.
1985) (discussing congressional rules and procedures). Congress has a highly decentralized power
structure. When a bill is introduced, it is referred to the appropriate committee, which in turn

frequently will refer the bill to the appropriate subcommittee. Sometimes, a bill is referred to more
than one committee in either the House or Senate becanse of overlapping committee responsibilities.
W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 12-14 (2d ed. 1984). Once
the bill has been referred to the appropriate committee or subcommittee, the committee members
will often solicit the opinions of the government agencies that would be affected by the passage of the
bill. The committee will probably hold hearings on the bill as well. At some point, the committee
will "mark up" or rework the bill before voting on it. If the mark-up has been extensive, the committee may reintroduce the bill in its "clean" form. J.VAN DER SLIK, AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESSES 208 (1977). After the committee has taken action on the bill, a report is issued and the
bill is placed on the House's calendar for consideration by all of the members of the House in which
the bill was introduced. Once one House has passed a bill, it is introduced in the second House,
provided that the bill was not simultaneously introduced into both Houses of Congress. After the
bill has been introduced in the second House, the bill undergoes the same basic process. At any
point in the legislative process, a bill can be delayed, defeated or substantially modified. Coalitions
must be built and maintained in order to garner the votes necessary to ensure passage of a bill.
Various committees, interest groups, or influential individuals may be able effectively to kill a bill by
forming and sustaining an opposition coalition on the committee or subcommittee level. W. OLESZEK, supra at 14-16.
127. See supra note 126; see also L. FROMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS: STRATEGIES,
RULES AND PROCEDURES 17 (1967).
128. W. OLESZEK, supra note 126, at 16-17.
129. Id.
130. Merrill, supra note 117, at 22-23 (citing G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9596 (1977)).
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given that state economic regulations will negatively affect at least some
private industry) the courts will be required to rule, one way or the other,
on the validity of a state's interstate economic regulation. In contrast,
the bureaucracy of Congress will be provoked to action only in those
instances in which the harm deriving from the state's regulation is
deemed truly substantial.
C. Comparing Congressionaland Judicial Oversight.
The States' Perspective.
There are important political reasons why the states would prefer
congressional to judicial control of their interstate economic regulations,
above and beyond the simple difference in political inertia. Initially, a
strong argument could be fashioned that Congress, as an institution, is
better equipped to make the type of policy decision that the Court now
makes under the dormant commerce clause. "Congress has the superior
institutional capability to gather the relevant economic information, and
Congress operates on the political basis considered most appropriate for
resolving normative questions." 131 Several members of the Court have
expressed this same thought:
Unconfined by "the narrow scope of judicial proceedings" Congress
alone can, in the exercise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only consider whether [the state enactment] is
consistent with the best interests of our national economy, but can also
on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a complicated
problem devise a national policy fair alike to the States and our

Union. 132
The judiciary has less access to relevant information than does Congress, which can marshall its committee and agency resources to hold
hearings and engage in debate before deciding the matter at hand. While
this can be said of any decision of the judiciary, it is of particular import
in dormant commerce clause cases because the decision made under the
dormant commerce clause is essentially a legislative determination.
Even if one were to reject the conclusion that Congress is better
equipped to make the proper determination under the commerce clause,
there is still a substantial factor weighing against the Court's use of the
dormant commerce clause. The view has been widely held, at the time of
ratification as well as in modem times, that the states have a special ability to protect their interests through resort to the national political pro131. Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 84 (1980).
132. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 189 (1940) (Black, Frankfurter &
Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting).
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cess. The modem basis for this view was articulated by Professor
Wechsler, who noted that Congress evinces an inherent tendency to
avoid new intrusions into the affairs of the states. 133 The constitutional
distribution of power between the three branches of the federal government, particularly the allocation of the lawmaking power to Congress, he
reasoned, is an essential means of protecting the states from federal intrusions.13 4 Wechsler concluded that "[flederal intervention as against the
states is thus primarily a matter for congressional determination in our
system as it stands."1 35 More recently, Dean Choper has become an effective advocate of the same position,1 36 and the current Supreme Court
has itself relied upon the unique political relationship between the states
and Congress in fashioning its doctrines of constitutional federalism.137
Nor did recognition of the states' potential influence in Congress go
unnoticed by the framers. Madison, for example, argued that:
As a security of the rights & powers of the States in their individual
capacities, ag[ainst] an undue preponderance of the powers granted to
the Government over them in their united capacity, the Constitution
has relied on ...[t]he responsibility of the Senators and Representatives in138the Legislature of the U. S. to the Legislatures & people of the
States.

Indeed, state influence was thought by some to be so great that the fear
was expressed that Congress might at some point actually be "captured"
by the states. 139
The long history of antagonism between the states and the federal
judiciary stands in striking contrast to the traditionally close political
relationship between the states and Congress. In fact, it was the lack of
133. Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Rdle of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 558 (1954).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 559.
136. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176-77

(1980); see also Grano, Prophylactic Rules in CriminalProcedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 100, 126-27 n.161 (1985).
137. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985). In a previous
article, one of the authors has criticized the Garcia Court's reliance on the states' political influence
in Congress to justify the effective exclusion of judicial review in interfederal constitutional disputes.
See Redish & Drizin, supra note 15, at 34, 36-38. There is no inconsistency, however, in recognizing
the political reality of the states' influence in Congress and its relevance to the allocation of supervisory authority between court and Congress on the one hand, and rejecting reliance on this fact as the
basis for the total abdication of judicial enforcement of the constitutional protections of federalism
on the other hand.
138. Letter of James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830) in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 338, 395-96 (1910).
139. See Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitationson Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 51-52
(1981).
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restraints on the federal judicial power that gave rise to much of the opposition to the adoption of the Constitution. While the framers agreed
that there should be one supreme judicial tribunal for the United
States,140 the establishment of inferior federal courts met with opposition
from both within and without the Convention. For example, the
mandatory creation of inferior federal courts was opposed in the Convention because the creation of the lower federal courts would make "an
unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction <of the States.> '"141
Lower federal courts were also seen as "creat[ing] jealousies & opposi-

tions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere." 142 James Monroe saw the creation of lower federal courts as
"highly improper and altogether unnecessary."' 143 Even creation of the

Supreme Court was opposed, because it was feared that the Court would
"6swallow up all other courts of judicature"-mainly the state courtsand would deprive the citizens of the states of their civil liberties. 144 The
fear was expressed that because of the existence of the federal judiciary

the state courts would "soon be annihilated," and that the federal courts
45
would destroy the rights that the states guaranteed to their citizens.'

The states' mistrust of the federal judiciary continued well after the
Constitution's ratification. ]In fact, modem commentators have suggested that the sole purpose behind the adoption of the eleventh amend-

ment was the fear that the federal courts would extend their jurisdiction
146
to include states, despite the absence of congressional authorization.
Thus, from the time of ratification to modem times, significant differ140. P. BATOR, P.MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FED11 (2d ed. 1973).
141. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNvETioN, supra note 107, at 124 (J.
Madison, June 5).
142. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENrlioN, supra note 107, at 45-46 (J.Madison, July
18).
143. Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
278, 304 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
144. Essays by the Impartial Examiner, Va. Independent Chronicle, Feb. 27, 1788, in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 143, at 172, 182.
145. Essay by a Georgian, Gazette of State of Georgia, Nov. 15, 1787, in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALiST, supra note 143, at 129, 134.
146. See Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action Against State
Governments and the History ofthe Eleventh and FourteenthAmendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413
(1975). Professor Nowak contends that:
[A] convincing argument can be made that the drafters of the eleventh amendment were
only responding to the judicial assnmption ofjurisdiction in suits brought by Tories against
states. It is also probable that the states' interest in the amendment was similarly limited.
The states were concerned that the federal courts, with whom they had no lobbying power,
would, if Chisholm were not overruled, impose other retroactive liabilities on them. They
feared that they would have no political recourse if life-tenured judges could assume jurisdiction in controversial actions, such as Tory suits. No evidence exists that the states had
the same fear of congressional authorization of suits against states. Indeed, given the assumption of state debts by the Congress in the period following the Revolutionary War it is
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
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ences have existed between the states' relationship with Congress and the
states' relationship with the federal judiciary.
It should now be clear why the Constitution left to Congress the
power to review most efforts by the states to regulate interstate commerce. While the framers selected what they deemed especially egregious or disruptive state economic practices for express constitutional
prohibition, 147 they apparently decided that in the great majority of situations the exercise of state authority should be presumed valid, subject
solely to the political check of Congress's preemptive power. 148
D. The ConstitutionalPreferencefor Congressional Control and the
Value of Federalism.
One might argue, of course, that judicial oversight is preferable for
the very reason that state regulation of interstate commerce is more
likely to stand under exclusive congressional review. But for present purposes, policy issues are beside the point. We have argued that (1) the
Constitution's text clearly provides for initial congressional, rather than
judicial review of state regulation of interstate commerce (assuming the
regulation violates no other constitutional prohibition), 149 and that (2)
there are important practical differences between the two forms of review.1 50 Once the constitutional preference is clearly ascertained, it is
not appropriate-short of resort to the amendment process-for the
courts to question the constitutional choice.
If one were to debate the issue purely as a matter of federalism policy, however, it is by no means clear that judicial oversight should be
deemed preferable to exclusive congressional review. Initially, as we
have already noted, examination of the relative fact-gathering capabilities
of the two institutions demonstrates the probable superiority of the legislative branch. 151
Moreover, that exclusive congressional control, for reasons already
discussed,1 52 is likely to result in considerably fewer invalidations of state
regulation of interstate commerce is wholly consistent with the values
most likely that these representatives had implicit faith in the congressional ability to balance the interests of the state and federal governments.
Id. at 1440-41. See also Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation ofPowers Issues in ControversiesAbout Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 683-88
(1976) (discussing the eleventh amendment as an exemplification of the principle of sovereign
immunity).
147. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; art. IV, § 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
148. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
149. See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 119-48 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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sought to be fostered by the choice of a federal system in the first place.
Under the dormant commerce clause, the Supreme Court invalidates
state regulations when they either discriminate against out-of-state residents or when they unduly burden interstate commerce, albeit in a nondiscriminatory manner. Because we believe that discriminatory state
regulations may be satisfactorily dealt with through resort to other constitutional provisions,15 3 effectively the only type of case to be discussed
is that involving nondiscriminatory burdens. When, one might ask, are
state regulations likely to impose an undue burden? The answer is, when
the state regulations differ markedly from the regulations iposed by its
neighboring states, for it is then that those moving in interstate com1 54
merce would have to adjust each time they crossed a new state line.
But the alternative is virtually parallel state regulation. The obvious cost
to a federal system of such federally imposed state regulatory orthodoxy
is the loss of a principal advantage of a federal system: the use of the
states as small-scale social laboratories, so that other states--or the federal government itself-might benefit by the experience, without incurring all of the possible risks that might result from a similar nationwide
experiment.15 5
A possible response might be that under the dormant commerce
clause, such state experimentation is not inherently precluded; it is only
when the Court concludes that the burdens imposed by a particular state
regulation outweigh its possible benefits that the regulation fails. The
fact remains, however, that judicial invalidation is considerably more
likely than congressional invalidation. Thus, the structure adopted by
the Constitution's text attempts to foster widespread state experimentation, while simultaneously providing the safety net of congressional preemption in those situations in which the interference with the flow of
interstate commerce is truly substantial. Under this constitutional structure, those involved in interstate commerce are put on notice that they
may be subjected to different regulations in different states, much as they
already must be aware that they may be subjected to differing substantive
153. See infra notes 190-226 and accompanying text.
154. See, eg., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959). Illinois enacted a statute
requiring the use of a contour rear fender mudguard on trucks and trailers operated on the highways
of the state. The Supreme Court held the statute invalid under the dormant commerce clause, noting that the state "did not attempt to rebut the ... showing that the statute in question severely
burdens interstate commerce," despite the fact that the statute was clearly nondiscriminatory. Id. at
528.
155. See generally Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917 (1985) (discussing existing system of federal conditional grant programs in the context of individual rights and proposing
several alternatives).
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legal liabilities in different states. This is simply the cost of our having
chosen a federal system of government.
IV.

NONTEXTUAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE

Several scholars have articulated what can be termed "nontextual"
justifications for the dormant commerce clause-ie., justifications not
based on the Constitution's text or history, but which nevertheless are
thought to legitimize the clause's continued existence in its present form.
We will limit our examination to three such justifications. First, we consider what can be called, for lack of a better term, the "implicit structural" argument for the dormant commerce clause. 156 This theory
maintains that while no explicit textual authorization may exist for the
dormant commerce clause concept, the principle is implicit within the
constitutional structure and is therefore valid. Second, we consider a
"subconstitutional" justification for the dormant commerce clause,
namely the concept of "constitutional common law." 157 Finally, we consider whether the longevity of the dormant commerce clause doctrine in
itself should present a barrier to the doctrine's demise.158 Ultimately,
none of these justifications should be accepted, either because they represent illegitimate constitutional theories, or cannot properly be applied to
justify the dormant commerce clause.
A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause as a Product of the Implicit
ConstitutionalInfrastructure.

Professor Regan relies on a "structural argument" to legitimize the
Court's use of the dormant commerce clause.1 59 An important aspect of
Professor Regan's structural argument is that it "does not need to be
supported by an argument from any single short bit of text (which is
there is
what lawyers normally mean by a 'textual' argument), so long 1as
' 60
no short bit of text that contradicts the structural argument.
Professor Regan maintains that the dormant commerce clause's
function is to foster the national interest in avoiding state protectionism. 1 61 The thrust of his thesis is that under an ideal constitution, 162 and
in the absence of contrary congressional action, the Court should limit
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
Regan, supra note 10, at 1110-25.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1112-25.
Id. at 1110-11.
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state power to regulate the economy by preventing the "states from engaging in protectionism . . .directed at other states." 163 He suggests
three objections to state protectionism that, when taken together, form a
structural foundation against such practices that justifies the Court's use
of the dormant commerce clause. 1c4 First, "it is inconsistent with the
very idea of political union."1 65 Second, it "cause[s] resentment and invite[s] protectionist retaliation" that "is likely to generate a cycle of escalating animosity and isolation . . . eventually imperiling the political
viability of the union itself."1 66 Third, it is inefficient because "it diverts
business away from presumptively low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of a federally cognizable benefit."1 67 Based on
these objections, Regan concludes that the dormant commerce clause's
existence can be rationalized, despite the absence of explicit textual
168
authorization.
For reasons of American political theory, 169 we have a great deal of
trouble with any argument that would vest in an unrepresentative judiciary the power to invalidate legislative actions on grounds not even arguably mentioned somewhere in the Constitution's text. It is common
knowledge that the constitutional text is sufficiently broad to justify numerous modifications of legal doctrine in light of changing social needs
and values. 170 One should be properly suspicious, then, of any claims
that the Constitution can be found to embody a fundamental-albeit implicit-principle, untied to any textual provision or combination of
provisions.
Indeed, as Professor Regan's theory aptly illustrates, one making
such an argument is likely to be faced with an inherent "Catch 22": presumably only principles that are deemed truly fundamental may be found
within the Constitution's implicit structure; yet the more fundamental
the principle, the more puzzling is its omission from the explicit constitutional text. For present purposes, however, the point to be emphasized is
that there is no legitimate basis for reading into the Constitution some
implicit principle limiting state power to regulate interstate commerce.
163. Id. at 1094.
164. Id. at 1112-25.
165. Id. at 1113.
166. Id. at 1114.
167, Id. at 1119.
168. Id. at 1124-25.
169, See supra note 15.
170. See generally Powell, supra note 109 (arguing that the personal intention of the various
framers should not guide modem interpretations of the Constitution). But see 3 R. ROTUNDA, J.
NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3,§ 23.5(c) (listing a variety of theories for discerning the meaning

of the Constitution).
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This is because, as we have shown, the constitutional text was apparently
structured for the very purpose of establishing Congress as the sole overseer of state regulation of interstate commerce-a goal that made political sense at the time of the ratification and remains equally valid to the
present day. Thus even if one were to concede that, in appropriate circumstances, implicit structural principles may be ascertained, surely it
would be illegitimate to adopt such a principle when to do so would directly undermine a carefully structured, explicit textual balance.
B.

The Dormant Commerce Clause as ConstitutionalCommon Law.

Several constitutional scholars have articulated what can be termed
a "subconstitutional" basis for the dormant commerce clause: constitutional common law. Professor Henry Monaghan is the leading advocate
of the generic concept of constitutional common law. He has argued:
[A] surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional
"interpretation" is best understood as something of a quite different
order-a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law
17 1
subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.
Monaghan was "driven to conclude that the Court has a common
law power" after he examined several cases in which the Court applied a
judicially created doctrine desigued to deter violations of constitutional
rights by prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments-the exclusionary rule. 172 He reasoned that either the Court was mistaken in applying the exclusionary
rule in these cases or that the Court was exercising a common-lawmaking
power. 173 Unable to recognize the Court's human frailty, he adopted the
latter position. 174
For our purposes what is interesting about Professor Monaghan's
paradigmatic explanation of the Court's applications of the exclusionary
rule is his reference to the dormant commerce clause as "one of the most
salient illustrations" of constitutional common law. 175 Monaghan noted
that the Court had consistently recognized Congress's power to overrule
dormant commerce clause decisions by appropriate legislation, and quite
rightly asked how such a result could obtain if the Court actually were
171. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975).
172. Id. at 3-10.
173. Id. at 10.
174. Id. Monaghan believed that it was "too late in the day to conclude that" the Court was
mistaken. Id.
175. Id. at 15.
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interpreting the Constitution. 176 He rejected the Court's two proffered
justifications for the dormant commerce clause, asserting that the "most
satisfactory" explanation for the dormant commerce clause decisions was
the Supreme Court's development of what he termed constitutional common law, derived from-but not directly based in-the text of the commerce clause. 177 This commerce clause common law would advance the
commerce clause's purported "national, free-trade philosophy," he con178
tended, by negating state-imposed obstructions to free trade.
Before focusing on the specific issue of the dormant commerce
clause as constitutional common law, it is appropriate initially to examine the legitimacy of the broad concept. The abstract concept of constitutional common law is both puzzling and troubling. These issues do
not arise except in cases in which a court is considering invalidation of
state or federal legislative or executive action-that is, the actions of the
representative branches of government. If the court takes such action, it
has authority to do so only when it has found the challenged law or
activity to violate a provision of the Constitution; in a constitutional democracy, it lacks authority to reach such a result on any other basis. Yet
if the court has, in fact, invalidated legislation because of a conflict with a
provision of the Constitution, whence does Congress derive authority to
overrule that constitutional interpretation?
Constitutional common law, in Professor Monaghan's view, is a species of Judge Friendly's "specialized" federal common law. 179 When the
Court first created federal common law, it had to point to some authoritative text as the source of the substantive law it had just manufactured.180 Thus, the Court was forced to rely on statutes, treaties and
181
constitutional provisions when it articulated federal common law.
Monaghan argued that, because federal courts were recognized as having
the power to fashion federal common law where authorized to do so by
statute, it follows ipso facto that the Court could fashion constitutional
common law.' 8 2 But there is a significant difference between judicial creation of statutory common law and constitutionalcommon law: the for176. Id.

177. Id. at 15-17.
178. Id. at 17. Monaghan explained that the reason the dormant commerce clause cases were
not deemed to be the result of common law jurisprudence was that traditional Marbury nullification
was the accepted norm and that the dormant commerce clause invalidation did not "'look like' the
affirmative creation of federal regulatory rules." Id.

179. Id. at 10-11. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405 (1964) (praising Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) for facilitating the development of a limited, but "predictable and useful" federal common law).
180. Monaghan, supra note 171, at 12.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 12-13.
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mer arises from congressionally created authority and can therefore
logically be overridden by Congress, while the latter is supercongressional, and thus not subject to congressional reversal. In a sense, then,
the term "constitutional common law" is an oxymoron, since it combines
in one phrase authority that is simultaneously beyond yet within congressional power to overrule.
There is, however, no need at this point to provide a detailed analysis of the merits of constitutional common law. For present purposes, we
need not contest the legitimacy of constitutional common law as an abstract category of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Even if one accepts the
validity of the concept as a general matter, recognition of the dormant
commerce clause as constitutional common law would be improper.
The federal common law process requires that the Court rely on the
relevant authoritative text-in this case the Constitution-for guidance
in formulating the appropriate common law rule.1 83 But, as Professor
Monaghan himself noted, the Court must also consider the structure of
1 84
the text, its place, and the "need for a uniform national rule of law."
This is because federal common law of any sort is designed to play a gapfilling role in federal jurisprudence.1 85 To be legitimate, then, constitutional common law must at the very least further the policies of a particular constitutional provision and be in accord with the Constitution's
structure of government.
If our view of the delicate structural balance of federalism manifested in the text is accepted,1 86 the dormant commerce clause does
considerably more than play a gap-filling role in constitutional jurisprudence. In our view, the dormant commerce clause is in direct opposition
to the Constitution's structure for controlling state power, and thus undermines the constitutional balance of federalism. As such, the dormant
commerce clause cannot properly be said to further the commerce
clause's purposes, because those purposes inherently include exclusive
congressional oversight of most state regulation of interstate commerce.
Nor can it be said to be in accord with the constitutional structure of
government or federalism. Characterizing the dormant commerce clause
as constitutional common law therefore does not justify the Court's continued use of the clause.
183. Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), "[t]he laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision" for the federal courts. Id.
184. Monaghan, supra note 171, at 12.
185. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them.").
186. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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The Longevity of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine as a
Barrierto Its Own Demise.

A final conceivable nontextual justification for the dormant commerce clause is the simple fact that the concept has been employed by the
judiciary at least since the time of Cooley, and therefore has become part
of our accepted judicial and political tradition. It is therefore practically
inappropriate and theoretically unnecessary to abandon the doctrine,
even if it originally amounted to a judicial usurpation of authority not
found anywhere in the constitutional text.
We have considerable trouble with such an argument. Initially, as a
purely descriptive matter there is something disingenuous about a rigid,
blind appeal to precedent as a defense of otherwise questionable Supreme
Court doctrine. In numerous areas of constitutional law, the Court has
not hesitated to abandon even well-known precedent when it found it
outmoded or morally offensive. 18 7 Such an attitude should be at least as
prevalent when the attack on Supreme Court doctrine is that the relevent
decisions usurp power nowhere authorized in constitutional text.
Moreover, as a normative matter, an argument solely from precedent amounts to a form of "proof by adverse possession": if the Court
has usurped authority for a long enough period without generating sufficient opposition to break through imbedded public inertia, that usurpation becomes valid, for no reason other than that the Court has managed
to get away with it. Some might respond that a practice conducted without interruption for so long a period has effectively become part of our
systemic tradition, and this factor provides the requisite legitimizing basis. 188 But the fact that a practice has lasted long enough that it could be
described as a "tradition" surely has not in the past prevented us from
challenging the practice's normative basis, as is clearly demonstrated by
our rejection of such long-established practices as slavery and the "sepa187. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) ("[W]e cannot say that a law
which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem
to have been questioned .. .") with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) ("Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected."); compare National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that congressional regulations cannot "operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions") with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (the
attempt in NationalLeague of Cities to "draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms
of 'traditional governmental function' is ... unworkable").
188. Cf Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545 (1985) (Judicial abstention with respect to certain cases properly within a federal court's jurisdiction "is much more
pervasive than is generally realized" and such "discretion is wholly consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition.").
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rate-but-equal" doctrine. Similarly, our allocation of governmental authority is established to a large extent by the text and textual structure of
the Constitution, and a clear departure from that structure does not attain legitimacy merely because of the length of its existence. 189
V.

POST-MORTEM: LIFE WITHOUT THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE

Now that the dormant commerce clause has met its belated demise
at our hands, important questions remain. Must state regulations that
unduly burden or discriminate against interstate commerce be deemed
constitutional? Could a state, consistent with the Constitution, effectively "Balkanize" the nation by setting up guards at its borders to collect an entrance tax from nonresidents? Could it impose custom duties
on goods shipped from other states? May it provide economic benefits to
its resident businesses while flagrantly denying them to out-of-state competitors? A pragmatist might argue that the dormant commerce clause,
regardless of its constitutional foundation, is required to invalidate just
such state legislation. But even absent the dormant commerce clause, the
Constitution provides a textual structure for the regulation of commerce
which can quite effectively prevent an economic Armageddon at the
hands of the states.
Initially, there is no doubt that Congress, pursuant to its commerce
power, has authority to preempt all such state legislation, and it is highly
likely that it would do just that in the face of such flagrant, harmful state
protectionism. Indeed, under our view of the constitutional balance,
Congress was given power in article I to regulate interstate commerce in
large part to provide a legislative safety net against state economic Balkanization. The potentially most egregious state legislation, however,
would likely never even require affirmative congressional preemption.
This section is designed to explore how the textual structure of federal189. Paul Brest has argued that uninterrupted departures from constitutional text may become
part of our normative tradition, because "it is only through a history of continuing assent or acquiescence that the document could become law." Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 225 (1980) (footnote omitted). We disagree, for as one of us has
argued previously:
if one accepts the values of predictability and stability that inhere in the moral dictate of
the rule of law, it is by no means clear that incremental and furtive alteration or abandonment of a society's governing document... should be morally acceptable. Otherwise, we
would effectively be condoning any governmental usurpation of authority that did not
somehow break through the inertia of public passivity. A morally preferable solution...
would be to accept the force of the governing document, unless it is altered by means of the
process ordained in the document itself, or by means of a true revolution, which openly
and clearly rejects the document in favor of a new political compact and governing structure.
Redish & Drizin, supra note 15, at 29-30.
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ism would- or could- operate in the absence of the dormant commerce
clause.
A.

Comparing the Commerce and Privileges and Immunities Clauses.

Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution provides that "The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." 190 The Court has recognized that the dormant
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause have a "mutually reinforcing relationship" which "stems from their common origin in
the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation"; 191 nevertheless,
there exist notable distinctions between the clauses, in both interpretation
and application.
The privileges and immunities clause was purportedly designed to
promote interstate harmony and cooperation in order to prevent the dissolution of the Union. 192 Each state was to be constitutionally prohibited
from placing out-of-state citizens at a disadvantage. The text of the Constitution, however, sheds little light on exactly what constitutes the
"Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The clause
has been said to be an abbreviated version of the privileges and immunities clause contained in the Articles of Confederation.1 93 Thus, to determine the nature of the constitutional protection of commerce afforded by
the clause, we examine two areas: first, the privileges and immunities
clause contained in the Articles of Confederation and the development of
the parallel clause in the Constitution; and second, the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause.
1. The Privilegesand Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation and Its ConstitutionalParallel. The Constitution's predecessor,
the Articles of Confederation, contained a similar but more textually
elaborate guarantee of interstate comity. Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation stated:
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these States... shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
190. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
191. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978).
192. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984)
("The Privileges and Immunities Clause ...imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests
of interstate harmony.").
193. Simson, DiscriminationAgainst Nonresidentsand the Privileges and Immunities Clause of

Article IV 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 383 (1979).
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194
inhabitants thereof respectively ....
Note that under the Articles of Confederation, out-of-state residents
were textually guaranteed that they could engage in commerce in other
states "subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants" of the situs state.
Charles Pinckney, generally recognized as the author of article IV's
privileges and immunities clause, 195 wrote in 1787 that "[t]he 4th article,
respecting the extending [of] the rights of the Citizens of each State,
throughout the United States... is formed exactly upon the principles of
the 4th article of the present Confederation." 196 At the Convention, the
clause became part of the Constitution with virtually no debate. 197 As
Professor Simson has noted: "it seems reasonable to infer that familiar
principles-specifically, those spelled out in the provision of the Articles
of Confederation on which the clause plainly was based-were widely
1 98
understood to inform the clause."
If such an interpretation of the constitutional privileges and immunities clause had been adopted consistently, it would have been similar in
at least certain respects to the operation of the dormant commerce
clause. Both would have prohibited state economic protectionism that
discriminated against nonresidents; and therefore to the extent that the
dormant commerce clause is concerned solely with such discrimination,
the overlap would be substantial. Even so, significant differences would
remain. Initially, the reach of the dormant commerce clause has never
been limited to discriminatory state regulations. Rather, the Court has
struck down even regulations neutrally applied to residents and nonresidents alike if they are found to unduly burden interstate commerce. 199
Scholars have debated the theoretical merits of this extension, 200 but
there can be little doubt that it remains an accepted element of the
Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. 20 1 There exists, however, no rational means of construing the terms of the privileges
and immunities clause to extend beyond discriminatory state regulations.
Secondly, even as to discriminatory legislation, a major difference exists
between the impact of the two clauses. Supreme Court applications of
194. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV.

195. Simson, supra note 193.
196. C. Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, In Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 107, app. A, ch. CXXIX, at 112.
197. Simson,supra note 193, at 384 (citing 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra

note 107, app. A, ch. CXXIX, at 437).
198. Ia
199. See supra uotes 73-77 and accompanying text.
200. See, eg., Regan, supra note 10, at 1091; Eule, supra note 8, at 425.
201. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:569

the dormant commerce clause may be reversed by congressional legislation;202 decisions enforcing the privileges and immunities clause-like judicial interpretations of all other constitutional provisions-are beyond
congressional reach.
If these were the only differences between the effect of the two
clauses, little would be lost, as a practical matter, by abandoning the dormant commerce clause. While it is possible that nondiscriminatory state
legislation could have a negative impact on national interests, such regulation is not nearly as threatening to the goal of national unity as is discriminatory legislation. In the relatively rare instance in which
nondiscriminatory legislation is truly harmful, the availability of congressional preemptive power under the commerce clause should provide adequate protection. Nor is it clear that the availability of congressional
reversal of Supreme Court holdings is either necessary or even wise, since
the practice is so strikingly aberrant from traditional constitutional
theory.
For reasons that are not entirely clear, however, the Court, at least
in modem times, has declined to find all state discriminatory legislation
invalid under the privileges and immunities clause. Instead, it has
adopted the approach originally taken in the 1823 circuit court case
Corfield v. Coryell,20 3 extending constitutional protection under the privileges and immunities clause only if out-of-state residents were discriminated against in the exercise of so-called "fundamental" rights. 2 4 In
Corfield, Justice Washington rejected the argument that a citizen of one
state could "participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the
citizens of any other particular state, merely upon the ground that they
are enjoyed by those citizens. ' ' 2° - He enumerated several general categories of protected privileges and immunities, including the ability "to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take,
hold and dispose of property.., and an exemption from higher taxes or
2 0° 6
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state.
Whether more recent interpretations have returned to the earlier
broad construction, however, is unclear.2 0 7 In any event there appears to
202. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
203. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
204. Simson, supra note 193, at 379-80; see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978) (discriminatory hunting license fees upheld because equal access to state elk not vital for wellbeing of nation).
205. 6 F. Cas. at 552.

206. Id.
207. See, eg., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (invalidating Alaskan statute requiring all
oil and gas leases, rights-of-way permits or easements for gas or oil pipelines, and unitization agreements to contain a provision giving hiring preference to qualified Alaskans over nonresidents).
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be no textual, historical or policy reason that binds the Court to the "fundamental rights" interpretation. Indeed, if anything, the opposite is true:
there appears to be no textual basis for the imposition of such a
requirement.
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation. Advocates of the dormant commerce clause have argued that modem Supreme Court doctrine shows that the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses
serve different constitutional purposes, and therefore both clauses are required. 208 Although at one point the Court has noted that there exists a
"mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause, ' 20 9 at other times
it has declared that the commerce and privileges and immunities clauses
serve different constitutional purposes. 2 10 In United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,2 11 for example, Justice
Rehnquist wrote that "[t]he two Clauses have different aims and set different standards for state conduct. ' 2 12 He stated that "[t]he Commerce
Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers. Such
powers must give way before the superior authority of Congress to legis2 13
late on (or leave unregulated) matters involving interstate commerce.
Rehnquist distinguished the privileges and immunities clause, stating
that it "imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of interstate harmony.... It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on
matters of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation
'2 14
affecting interstate commerce.
We remain unpersuaded by Chief Justice Rehnquist's proffered distinctions, however. Initially, the distinction premised on the implied or
direct nature of the regulation has nothing to do with the purposes served
by the clauses; it merely underscores the lack of any textual support for
the dormant commerce clause. Similarly, the fact that judicial application of the dormant commerce clause "must give way before the superior
authority of Congress" also has nothing to do with the purposes of the
two clauses; it once again merely underscores the aberrant nature of the
208. See Regan, supra note 10, at 1202-06.
209. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531.
210. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984).
211. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
212. Id. at 220.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Professor Jonathan Varat argues that "[a]t the most elementary level, the primary concern of the commerce clause is business that involves more than one
state, whereas the core concern of the interstate privileges and immunities clause is the treatment
received within a state by the citizens of other states." Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate

Equality, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 487, 499 (1981).
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dormant commerce clause in constitutional theory. Finally, Rehnquist's
contention that the privileges and immunities clause was designed to foster "interstate harmony" and the avoidance of "discrimination against
out-of-state residents" 21 5 actually underscores the theoretical similarity

of the two clauses. While the Court has declared that the rights protected under the privileges and immunities clause are those rights "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity, ' 21 6 it similarly has
noted that the commerce clause was created because of "'the mutual

jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers
and other economic retaliation,' "217 and that "[i]t is... beyond doubt
that the Commerce Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in
preventing economic Balkanization. ' ' 218 Moreover, the Court has consistently invalidated discriminatory state regulations pursuant to the dormant commerce clause, because "the peoples of the several states must
sink or swim together, and ... in the long run prosperity and salvation

are in union and not division. ' ' 21 9 Thus, it appears that the Court has
recognized the same right under both the privileges and immunities and
the dormant commerce clauses-the right of an out-of-state resident to
be free from discriminatory state regulations of commerce.

B.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the CorporationsProblem.

To this point, we have established that, both doctrinally and theoretically, the privileges and immunities clause could adequately fulfill at
least the primary function now served by the dormant commerce clause.
There remains, however, one current doctrinal aspect of privileges and

immunities clause jurisprudence that could effectively prevent that clause
from serving as an adequate substitute for the dormant commerce clause.
The Court has consistently maintained that a corporation is not entitled
to the protection granted by the privileges and immunities clause because
corporations are not "citizens. ' 220 The Court's failure to extend the pro215. 465 U.S. at 220.
216. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Coinm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
217. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (quoting court below, 7 F. Supp.
776, 780 (1934)).
218. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
219. GA.F Seelig, 294 U.S. at 523.
220. In both Hope Ins. Co. v. Boardman, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 57, 59 (1809), and Bank of United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), the Court held that a corporation was not a
citizen because a corporation was an artificial legal entity, and as such, could not sue or be sued in
federal court. In Deveaux, the Court, however, concluded that the corporation's stockholders could
sue and be sued in federal court under the corporation's name. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 91-92.
Thirty years later in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 (1839), the Court
refused to extend Deveaux in order to recognize that corporations enjoy the protection of the privi-
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tection of the privileges and immunities clause to corporations presents
an obvious practical problem, because of the enormous amount of commerce that is conducted by corporations. The scope of the privileges and
immunities clause is not the primary focus of this article and therefore an
exhaustive examination of the corporations issue is not included. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably argued that corporations should, in fact, be
afforded the protections of article IV.
From a policy perspective, there can be little doubt that corporations should receive the protections of the privileges and immunities
clause. A substantial portion of business in the nation-and therefore
interstate business as well-is conducted by corporate entities. To the
extent the clause is designed to establish interstate harmony, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist has suggested, 22 1 the exclusion of corporations from
the clause's scope precludes fulfillment of this goal. Thus, the only conceivable basis for the exclusion of corporations is a textual argnment: the
word "citizens" cannot rationally be defined to include corporations.
But in light of the generally liberal interpretations traditionally given
constitutional langnage, such an argument is disingenuous. The term
"person" in the fourteenth amendment 222 has been consistently interpreted to include corporations,2 2 3 and the term "citizens" in the diversity
jurisdictional statute,224 which in turn is premised on the use of the same
term in article III of the Constitution, 225 includes corporations by its langnage. Why, then, should we hesitate to treat the same term in article IV
in the same manner?
leges and immunities clause. Chief Justice Taney, writing for the Court, maintained that if a corporation were permitted to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would also have to bear
the accompanying liabilities of citizens. Id. at 586. This result, he concluded, would reduce the
corporation to "a mere partnership in business" and the corporation's stockholders would be liable
for the full extent of the corporation's obligations. Id. Consequently, the Chief Justice refused to
extend to corporations the protection of article IV's privileges and immunities clause. See id. at 58687.
Similarly, in Paul v. Virginia, the Court responded to the assertion that the privileges and immunities clause applied to corporations by declaring that "[t]he term citizens ... [in the privileges
and immunities clause] applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed." 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868). The Court continued
that corporations only possess those rights contained in their charters and not their shareholders'
rights as citizens of a state. See id. at 180. The Court has maintained this position to date. 1 R.
ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 3, § 12.7.
221. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
223. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
225. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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If, however, corporations cannot, for some unknown reason, be extended rights under the privileges and immunities clause, an alternative
remains. Congress could, pursuant to the commerce clause, prohibit discrimination by the states against out-of-state corporations engaged in interstate commerce. Additionally, Congress could preempt state
regulations of commerce that discriminate against corporations by prescribing its own substantive federal regulations. Either of these alternatives would be consistent with the Constitution's text, and would not
226
alter the constitutional balance of federalism.

VI.
A.

THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS MODEL AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
THE TEXTUAL CRITIQUE

The Nature of the Democratic Process Model.

In recent years, several commentators have reached an ultimate conclusion similar in many respects to our own: that the sole legitimate rationale for judicial invalidation of state legislation burdening interstate
commerce is the discriminatory impact of that legislation on out-of-state
residents. At least one of those scholars has also concluded that that
function can adequately be performed by resort to the privileges and immunities clause.22 7 But while this view and our own are similar in result,
the theoretical analyses leading us to our respective conclusions are quite
different. In fact, however, we believe that the reasoning of those scholars who have previously reached this result is fundamentally flawed in
several respects.
Earlier commentators have argued that "[t]he time-honored rationales for traditional dormant commerce clause jurisprudence have become historical vestiges, ' 228 and that "[i]n the end ... we are left with
only a single justification for judicial displacement of state legislative
judgments in the commercial area-the process-oriented protection of
representational government. ' 22 9 This theory, which we label the "democratic process" model, turns on the fact that the out-of-state citizens
affected by a state's commercial regulations are not represented in the
legislature that enacted them. Its origins can be found in the opinion of
Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Bros., Inc. :230
Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in
judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
Eule, supra note 8, at 446-55.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 443.
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
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burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action
is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on2 31legislation where it affects adversely some interests
within the state.
Those who believe this to be the key factor argue:
When regulations promulgated by a legislative body fall solely or
predominantly on a group represented in the legislature there is cause
to believe the enactment will be rationally based, efficacious, and no
more burdensome than is necessary to achieve the proffered purpose.
When the state enacts legislation... falling principally on out-of-stain the regulating body, such a presumption is
ters not represented
232
unwarranted.
As Professor Tushnet has argued, this theory "can be viewed as a political application of the economists' theory of externalities: because a legislative body may underestimate the burdens that its proposals place on
people who do not participate in its selection, the resulting statutes may
'2 33
be inefficient.
To reach their ultimate conclusion, advocates of the democratic process model as the sole rationale for judicial invalidation of state regulation must establish two points: (1) that the rationale of their model is
valid, and (2) that no other conceivable policy rationale justifying a
broader based dormant commerce clause is equally valid. While our conclusion, reached through analysis of the textual structure, is coincidentally similar to that of the democratic process proponents, we believe that
their approach-tied purely to policy considerations, rather than a textual anchor-fails to meet either criterion for success.
B.

The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Process Model.

Initially, we believe that advocates of the democratic process model
cannot rationalize a test that turns solely on grounds of discrimination,
because even if accepted, the model proves too much. Once we agree
that the key factor is lack of representation in the legislative process, any
state regulation affecting the residents of other states ("foreigu" residents) whether discriminatory or not-is rendered suspect. For whether
or not the regulation disproportionately affects foreign residents, the fact
remains that the foreigu residents have had no say in the promulgation of
231. Id. at 185 n.2.
232. Eule, supra note 8, at 445. Professor Tushnet argued for a similar rationale. See Tushnet,
supra note 10, at 132-33 (suggesting that political restraints are likely to be inadequate in instances
where organized local consumers, as opposed to local producers, share in the burdens imposed upon
foreign shippers). Unlike Professor Eule, Professor Tushnet apparently intends not to shift the analysis to the umbrella of the privileges and immunities clause, but rather to infuse traditional dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence with this "representational" analysis.
233. Tushnet, supra note 10, at 129 n.14.
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the regulation that affects them. It is the very fact of this representational absence that violates the premise of the democratic process model.

Moreover, it is at least conceivable that some in-state residents may have
favored a regulation that foreign residents might oppose, even though the
regulation will affect both equally. It is also conceivable that some instate residents subjected to the regulation did oppose it, but lacked the

political strength to overcome its supporters in the legislature. In such
an event, if those foreign residents affected by the regulation had also
been represented in the legislature, the regulation might well have
234
failed.
Advocates of the democratic process model respond that, in terms

of economic efficiency, a regulation equally affecting both those represented and those unrepresented in the state's legislative process is much

more likely to be efficient and rational, because of the absence of the
equivalent of economic externalities. 235 Such an analysis, to borrow a
phrase from Professor Regan, smacks of "utopian Coaseism. ' ' 236 It is
absurd to suggest that the generally nondeliberative legislative process is
always-or even often-likely to result in the most rational or efficient
result. 237 But even if it did, that fact is largely beside the point. If the
value to be served is representational, as the model's advocates have as-

serted, 238 the fact remains that whether or not the regulation can ultimately be deemed efficient or rational, the foreign residents affected by it

have had no say in its adoption. This fact would seem to be critical, since
by its nature a model premised on notions of democratic theory is concerned withprocess values, 2 39 rather than the wisdom of a particular out-

come. If it were otherwise, a truly wise and benevolent dictatorship
could be as morally acceptable a form of government as democracy, a
234, A possible illustration would be anti-union legislation, enacted in a weak union state, that
affects various unions in neighboring states where unions are politically powerful.
235. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
236. Regan, supra note 10, at 1115 n.56. The phrase recalls Professor R.H. Coase's analysis of
"social costs," which assumes away transaction costs and places great reliance on affected parties'
ability to redistribute burdens through negotiation. See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 5-6, 15 (1960).
237. This, at least, is the view taken by the so-called "public choice" literature. See generally
Farber & Frickey, The JurisprudenceofPublic Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 878-83 (1987) (public
choice models often grounded in notion that political choices are determined by efforts of special
interest groups).
238. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
239. See, e-g., Walker, A Critique ofthe Elitist Theory of Democracy, 60 AM. POL.SC. REv. 285,
288 (1966). Professor Walker stated:
The most distinctive feature, and the principal orienting value, of classical democratic theory was its emphasis on individual participation in the development of public policy....
Although the classical theorists accepted the basic framework of Lockean democracy, with
its emphasis on limited government, they were not primarily concerned with the policies
which might be produced in a democracy; above all else they were concerned with human
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conclusion rejected by democratic theorists. 24 0 In short, the interest in
economic efficiency as an outgrowth of a concern over adequate representation amounts to a non sequitur. Thus, acceptance of the democratic
process model cannot logically stop with invalidation of discriminatory
legislation; even nondiscriminatory legislation affecting foreign residents
suffers from the same process-based defect.
C.

The Rejection of Alternative Values.
It is important to recall that advocates of the democratic process

model base their conclusion not on any analysis of constitutional text,

but rather on grounds of reason and political theory. 241 Once the textual
anchor is abandoned, advocates of any model for judicial action must of
course meet a burden of explaining why their approach is preferable, as a
matter of logic and political theory, to any other conceivable model.
Under this standard, the democratic process model must fail. Even if
one were to concede the logic of the democratic process model as a basis
for invalidating discriminatory legislation, the model's advocates have
not adequately disposed of all conceivable alternative values that a reviewing court might reasonably adopt as a rationale for overturning state
regulation-values that would not be adequately fostered solely by the

prohibition of discriminatory state legislation. Thus, absent a basis in
constitutional text to support their conclusion, democratic process advo-

cates fail to justify their ultimate solution.
While democratic process advocates attempt to dispose of certain
conceivable values that might be served by the dormant commerce
clause, 242 they neglect to deal with the one value possessing the strongest
development, the opportunities which existed in political activity to realize the untapped
potentials of men ....
Id. See also Bachrach,Interest, Participation,and Democratic Theory, in NOMOS XVI: PARTICIPennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975) ("Democratic participation ...is a
PATION IN POLITICS 39, 41 (J.
process in which persons formulate, discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and
directly affect their lives.").
240. See, eg., J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 45-53 (London
3d ed. 1865); see also P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE 98
(1967) ("[Man's dignity... is dependent upon an opportunity to participate actively in decisions
that significantly affect him.").
241. This is clearly true of Professor Tushnet. See generally Tushnet, supra note 10. Professor
Eule acknowledges the possible textual difficulties with the dormant commerce clause, Eule, supra
note 8, at 430, but does not seem to find them dispositive, largely because of what he understands to
be Madison's intent. Id. at 431. Moreover, he suggests that "[logic points inexorably to the courts"
as the federal governmental body that "was to bring the states back inline when they transcended
their authority." Id It appears clear that if the absence of textual support were the only problem
with the dormant commerce clause, Professor Eule would not favor its rejection.
242. Professor Eule assumes the justification for the dormant commerce clause to be the value of
the
free trade, and then proceeds to reject it. Eule, supra note 8, at 432-37. He concludes that "[iln
end.., we are left with only a single justification for judicial displacement of state legislative judg-
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historical foundation and the most reasonable grounding in American
political theory: the avoidance of Balkanization among the states resulting from trade policies that tend to disrupt the union. This was clearly
the greatest problem under the Articles of Confederation, and played an
important role in the establishment of the congressional commerce power
in article J.243 While discriminatory state legislation may, of course,
bring about such disunity, even nondiscriminatory state regulation that
significantly burdens the free flow of commerce from state to state may
give rise to this danger. 244 Hence, if a reviewing court-freed from all
textual restraints-were to conclude that the avoidance of Balkanization,
rather than concern over representation, constitutes the primary theoretical focus, it could very easily adhere to the Court's current balancing test
for determining the validity of evenhanded, nondiscriminatory state reg24 5
ulation burdening interstate commerce.
D. The Democratic Process Model and the ConstitutionalText.
Perhaps the greatest fallacy of the advocates of the democratic process model is their apparent assumption that a reviewing court is authorized to pick and choose among conceivable normative political theories
in deciding when to invalidate state legislation. 24 6 To be sure, there are
numerous textual provisions so broadly phrased that a reviewing courtalmost by necessity-will be called upon to ascertain and apply specific
political or moral values. 247 But as our examination of the textual structure has shown, the limitations on state authority to regulate interstate
commerce are not among them.
It so happens that the result reached by these theorists largely comports with the textual structure that we have discerned. This fact appears to be, at most, helpful icing on the cake to these theorists, in no
way essential to their ultimate conclusions.2 48 We have demonstrated,
however, that even if one were to abandon textual constraints in favor of
the fundamental normative assumptions made by the democratic process
theorists, their ultimate conclusion is at best unproven and at worst inments in the commercial area-the process-oriented protection of representational government." Id

at 443.
243. See E. CoRWIN, THE CoNsTrrTiON AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 46 (12th ed. 1958).
244. See supra text between note; 112 and 113.

245. See, eg., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly

excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.").
246. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.

247. See Redish & Drizin, supra note 15, at 51.
248. See supra note 241.
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correct. But even if their theoretical assumptions were universally conceded and their logical inferences inescapable, the approach would
remain fundamentally flawed. This is because in a constitutional democracy a reviewing court at the outset must anchor any judicial invalidation
of majoritarian action in the language of the Constitution. Absent such a
basis in text, all normative issues of political theory remain irrelevant to
the exercise of the court's judicial review power.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The dormant commerce clause lacks a foundation or justification in
either the Constitution's text or history, and, despite the efforts of
respected constitutional scholars, the clause cannot be satisfactorily rationalized outside the text of the Constitution. More importantly, the
dormant commerce clause alters the delicate balance of federalism
clearly manifested in the constitutional text. By vesting initial oversight
power in the judiciary, rather than Congress, the dormant commerce
clause shifts the political inertia against the states in the regulation of
interstate commerce, and leaves federal oversight of state regulation in
the hands of the governmental body traditionally thought to be least responsive to state concerns.
It is by no means clear that leaving oversight, at least of nondiscriminatory state regulation, exclusively in congressional hands is likely to be
harmful to the interests of the federal system. Judicial prohibition of
such regulation could in many instances stifle individual state experimentation by requiring orthodoxy in interstate treatment.
If the Court were to overrule its existing doctrine and reject the dormant commerce clause, the nation would not be reduced to a Balkanized
confederation. On the contrary, as we have demonstrated, the Constitution provides a textual allocation of power designed to prevent just such
an occurrence. For example, article IV's privileges and immunities
clause can be construed to prohibit the states from discriminating against
the citizens of other states who engage in commerce. The power to control nondiscriminatory state regulation, however, is granted to Congress,
not to the Court. It is Congress which must affirmatively exercise the
power to regulate interstate commerce. For those critics who perceive
this scheme to be socially or politically inadequate-a conclusion, we
should emphasize, that we reject-the only alternative is resort to the
amendment process in order to provide textual relief from any perceived
inadequacies. It is time to recognize that the dormant commerce clause
is little more than a figment of the Supreme Court's imagination-hardly
a legitimate basis, in a democratic society, upon which to premise judicial
invalidations of state legislative action.

